Thermal profiling to validate electronic device authenticity

ABSTRACT

Counterfeit electronic devices are detected by comparing a thermal profile of the counterfeit device and an authentic device under predetermined operating conditions. A thermal profile for an authentic electronic device is recorded executing an instruction set over time, such as with static infrared images at predetermined times, video infrared images over a predetermined time period or temperature measurements made at predetermined locations of the electronic device. In one embodiment, a thermal profile indicates that a processor device has been used in the place of a field programmable grid array device. In an alternative embodiment, an electromagnetic profile is detected instead of or in addition to the thermal profile. The electromagnetic profile of an authentic device is used to create an expected profile for comparison with an electromagnetic profile of electronic devices under test.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to validation of device authenticity andmore particularly to thermal profiling to validate electronic deviceauthenticity.

The present application relates to application Ser. No. 12/405,453,entitled “Electromagnetic Profiling to Validate Electronic DeviceAuthenticity” by David B. Kumhyr, and Glenn D. Johnson, William CharlesBulko, Jacobo A. Vargas and Yvonne M. Young, filed concurrently with thepresent application.

2. Description of the Related Art

Much of the value found in electronic devices is developed during thedesign of the electronic devices rather than the manufacture of theelectronic devices. For example, an integrated circuit processor oftenresults from an intense and expensive development process, but theactual materials used to build the integrated circuit processortypically cost only a few dollars. To protect the investment made indevelopment, integrated circuit manufacturers attempt to keep integratedcircuit designs from becoming public so that counterfeiters cannot copythe designs and produce fake circuits. In some instances, however,counterfeiters reverse engineer the design or the functions performed bythe design to create counterfeit devices. For example, switch and routerelectronic devices are built with many different kinds of electronicdevices, such as integrated circuit processors, application specificintegrated circuits (ASICs) and field programmable grid arrays (FPGAs).FPGAs are basically a collection of logical ports and functions, whichcan be combined in an arbitrary fashion to perform a specific function.A counterfeiter might assemble a router or switch device with acombination of authentic electronic devices that are difficult tocounterfeit, such as processor components, and counterfeit devices thatare somewhat easier to reverse engineer, such as FPGA components. Acounterfeiter might also alter an existing electronic device by removingselected components and replacing the selected components withcounterfeit components that include insidious functions. For example,FPGA functions are mimicked based on inputs and outputs by insteadprogramming the functions into a sufficiently powerful but lessexpensive processor or microcontroller that includes additionalfunctionality. A counterfeiter hides the misdeed by simply labeling thecounterfeit microcontroller with the counterfeited FPGA identifier. Anend user who purchases a device with counterfeit electronic devicecomponents often has no idea unless something goes wrong.

The presence of counterfeit electronic devices or electronic devicecomponents within an electronic device presents a number of businessrisks and security risks. With respect to business risks, an enterprisethat purchases a device from a name brand manufacturer typically paysmore for the device relative to competitive devices under the assumptionthat the name brand device has a higher quality with better performanceand reliability. Manufacturers who have their products counterfeitedrisk a loss in reputation because of failures associated withcounterfeit components. Components that do not function up to theoriginal manufacture specifications expose the end user to unplannedoutages and denial of warranty service, while the manufacturer isexposed to potential liability for fixing systems that the manufacturerdid not build or sell. For example, the manufacturer may not recognizethe counterfeit components or may elect to provide warranty service toprotect its reputation. In addition, counterfeit electronic devices andaltered electronic devices that include counterfeit components oftenhave different electromagnetic interference (EMI) characteristics froman authentic unaltered electronic device. Counterfeit electronic devicesand components can introduce EMI that exceeds Federal CommunicationCommission (FCC) limits and that interferes with the operation of otherelectronic components. Security risks arise where counterfeit equipmentis altered to allow unauthorized access to the device or other maliciouseffects. A microcontroller that mimics FPGA functionality in a router orswitch might include additional functionality that allows communicationof information to unauthorized network addresses.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with the present invention, an electronic device runs witha predetermined set of operating conditions. In one embodiment, athermal profile of the electronic device is compared with an expectedthermal profile to determine if the device or components within thedevice are authentic or counterfeit. In an alternative embodiment, anelectromagnetic profile of the electronic device is compared with anexpected electromagnetic profile to determine if the device orcomponents within the device are authentic or counterfeit. Thermalprofile and electromagnetic profile testing may both be used to test agiven electronic device to increase the likelihood that counterfeitcomponents or other alterations made to the electronic device will bediscovered.

This invention describes a method and apparatus for determining theauthenticity of an electronic device based upon a thermal profile of theelectronic device. A thermal profile of an authentic device isdetermined by executing an instruction set on the electronic deviceunder predetermined operating conditions, and measuring the thermalprofile with thermal detection devices, such as an infrared camera thatviews the electronic device or thermometers placed at predeterminedpositions that measure temperatures associated with the electronicdevice. An electronic device under test is subjected to the sameoperating conditions so that a comparable thermal profile is determinedusing a thermal detection device. For example, temperatures forcomponents within the electronic device are measured using infrared orthermometer devices. If the thermal profile of the electronic deviceunder test falls within a predetermined range of the authenticelectronic device thermal profile, the device is deemed authentic; ifnot, the device is deemed a counterfeit.

This invention further describes a method and apparatus for determiningthe authenticity of an electronic device based upon an electromagneticprofile of the electronic device. An electromagnetic profile of anauthentic device is determined by executing an instruction set on theelectronic device under predetermined operating conditions, andmeasuring the electromagnetic profile with electromagnetic detectiondevices, such as an antenna that receives radiofrequency energy emittedfrom the electronic device or at predetermined positions within theelectronic device. An electronic device under test is subjected to thesame operating conditions so that a comparable electromagnetic profileis determined using a electromagnetic detection device. For example,electromagnetic frequency and amplitude information for the electronicdevice or components within the electronic device are measured usingantennae. If the electromagnetic profile of the electronic device undertest falls within a predetermined range of the authentic electronicdevice electromagnetic profile, the device is deemed authentic; if not,the device is deemed a counterfeit

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention may be better understood, and its numerousobjects, features, and advantages made apparent to those skilled in theart by referencing the accompanying drawings. The use of the samereference number throughout the several figures designates a like orsimilar element.

FIG. 1 shows an authenticity module in which selected embodiments of thepresent invention may be implemented.

FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram of a process for identifying electronicdevice components as authentic or counterfeit in which selectedembodiments of the present invention may be implemented.

FIG. 3 shows an authenticity module in which selected embodiments of thepresent invention may be implemented.

FIG. 4 shows a flow diagram of a process for identifying an electronicdevice as authentic or counterfeit in which selected embodiments of thepresent invention may be implemented

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Referring now to FIG. 1, a block diagram depicts an authenticity module10 which analyzes a thermal profile of an electronic device 12 todetermine if the electronic device is authentic or counterfeit.Authenticity module 10 is, for example, instructions running on aprocessor and a computer readable medium, such as a personal computer.Electronic device 12 is any type of electronic device built from one ormore electronic components. For example, electronic device 12 is arouter, a switch or a personal computer built on a circuit board 14 witha processor 16, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 18, amicrocontroller 20 and a field programmable grid array (FPGA) 22. Aselectronic power is run through the components, such as with powerconnections formed in circuit board 14, the electronic device componentsperform operations that produce heat as a byproduct. Generally,processor 16, ASIC 18 and microcontroller 20 are capable of performingthe functions of FPGA 22 but with a greater use of power and greaterproduction of heat as a byproduct. An authentic electronic device is onewhich was manufactured by an authorized manufacturer to specificationsset for the electronic device, such as a set of authorized components. Acounterfeit electronic device is one which was not manufactured by anauthorized manufacturer or that was manufactured by an authorizedmanufacturer but subsequently altered, such as by the replacement ofauthorized components with unauthorized components.

Authenticity module 10 analyzes a thermal profile of an electronicdevice to determine if the device is authentic or counterfeit.Authenticity module 10 performs an authenticity analysis by comparing athermal profile detected at an electronic device 12 operating underpredetermined conditions with thermal profiles of authentic electronicdevices stored in a thermal profile database 24. Authentic electronicdevice thermal profiles are generated by monitoring thermal energyassociated with components during operation of the components in a setenvironmental condition, such as a constant preset external temperatureand power supply. For example, a selected instruction set is executed onelectronic device 12 over a period of time, during which the componentsin electronic device 12 are monitored by thermal detection devices, suchas an infrared camera 26, a strip of aligned crystal thermometers 28 inset positions relative to the components, or other temperature measuringdevices, such temperature sensitive color strips that change colors atdifferent temperatures. The thermal profile includes static infraredimages taken at time setpoints for electronic device 12 and/orcomponents within electronic device 12, an infrared video image takenover a time period or temperature measurements at set locations. Thethermal profile includes information about the temperatures of thecomponents relative to each other. Authenticity module 10 uses thethermal profile information about known authentic electronic devices 12as stored in thermal profile database 24 to compare with measuredthermal profiles of suspect electronic devices 12 in order to determineif the suspect electronic device is authentic or counterfeit.

In operation, authenticity module 10 interfaces with thermal profiledetection devices, such as infrared camera 26 or thermometer 28, andwith thermal profile database 24. Authenticity module 10 communicates aninstruction set through a bus 32 for execution on electronic device 20,such as the instruction set used on an authentic electronic device tocreate thermal profile database 24. Authenticity module 10 commandsexecution of the instruction set and commands gathering of thermalprofile information from thermal profile detector devices, such asinfrared information from infrared camera 26 and temperature informationfrom thermometer 28. Graph 30 depicts an example of temperaturesmeasured over time for a processor 16 and an FPGA 22. Authenticitymodule 10 compares the measured thermal profile information with thermalprofile information in thermal profile database 24 to determine ifelectronic device 12 is authentic or counterfeit. The comparison caninclude infrared information at static time set points, such as t₁ andt₂, over a time period, such as the time between t₁ and t₂, ortemperature information gathered by a thermometer 28. The comparison maybe automatic based on measured temperature values that fall within adesired range or the temperature values of the thermal profile database24 values, or may be presented at a display for consideration by an enduser. Comparisons might also include temperature differences measuredbetween components of an electronic device 12 and the differencesbetween the same devices in thermal profile database 24. As an example,if a counterfeit electronic device 12 replaced an FPGA 22 with amicrocontroller 20 or other type of processor, the processor will run ata higher temperature than the FPGA in the authentic thermal profile andwill also run nearer in temperature to the other processors on theelectronic device 12. Comparisons might also include a comparison with aknown counterfeit device thermal profile so that match with that thermalprofile by a device under test establishes the device under test as acounterfeit.

Referring now to FIG. 2, a flow diagram depicts a process foridentifying electronic devices as authentic or counterfeit. The processbegins at step 34 with the development of thermal profiles for authenticcomponents in an authentic electronic device running under predeterminedconditions. For example, a given instruction set is looped in executionon the authentic device for set time period with set environmentalconditions and thermal measurements are taken by thermal detectiondevices, such as an infrared camera or thermometers. At step 36, anelectronic device under test for authenticity is placed under thepredetermined conditions used to generate the authentic thermal profile,such as by executing the same instruction set at the same environmentalconditions for the same time period. At step 38, the thermal profile ofthe electronic device under test is monitored during the predeterminedconditions. For example, infrared static or video images of theelectronic device and its components or temperature readings from setthermometer positions are taken over the test time period. At step 40,the authentic electronic device thermal profile is compared against thethermal profile measured at the electronic device under test todetermine if the measured thermal profile falls within a predeterminedrange of the authentic thermal profile. At step 42, if the measuredthermal profile falls within a predetermined range of the authenticthermal profile, the electronic device under test is deemed authentic.If the measured thermal profile falls outside of the predetermined rangeof the authentic thermal profile, the electronic device under test isdeemed a counterfeit.

Referring now to FIG. 3, a block diagram depicts an authenticity module10 which analyzes an electromagnetic profile of an electronic device 12to determine if the electronic device is authentic or counterfeit.Authenticity module 10 is, for example, instructions running on aprocessor and a computer readable medium, such as a personal computer.As electronic power is run through the components, such as with powerconnections formed in circuit board 14, the electronic device componentsperform operations that produce radiofrequency electromagnetic energy asa byproduct. Generally, processor 16, ASIC 18 and microcontroller 20 arecapable of performing the functions of FPGA 22 but with a greater agreater number of instructions and at greater operating frequencies sothat electromagnetic radiation as a byproduct processor-type deviceswill have a higher frequency and higher amplitude than that of FPGAdevices.

Authenticity module 10 analyzes an electromagnetic profile of anelectronic device to determine if the device is authentic orcounterfeit. Authenticity module 10 performs an authenticity analysis bycomparing an electromagnetic profile detected at an electronic device 12operating under predetermined conditions with electromagnetic profilesof authentic electronic devices stored in an electromagnetic profiledatabase 24. Authentic electronic device electromagnetic profiles aregenerated by monitoring electromagnetic energy associated with operationof electronic device 12 in a predetermined operating condition. Forexample, a selected instruction set is executed on electronic device 12during which electronic device 12 and/or the components in electronicdevice 12 are monitored by antennas 44 interfaced with a spectrograph ofauthenticity module 10. In one embodiment, antennae 44 are locatedexternal to a housing 46 that contains the electronic components so thatthe electromagnetic profile includes radiofrequency collectively outputfrom the components within housing 46. In an alternative embodiment,antennae are located in set positions within housing 46 relative to thecomponents to measure radiofrequency energy output in close proximity toselected components. The electromagnetic profile includes radiofrequencyenergy frequency and amplitude output when electronic device 12 executesinstructions. A particular instruction set may be designed to execute onparticular components for more accurate analysis of electromagneticenergy output from a component. Alternatively, a signal generator 48introduces a predetermined electromagnetic signal to electronic device12 through a port interfaced with bus 32 so that electromagnetic energythat passes from within housing 46 is measured at antenna 44 external tohousing 46. The electromagnetic profile includes information about thefrequency and amplitude of the components within housing 46 relative toeach other. Authenticity module 10 uses the electromagnetic profileinformation about known authentic electronic devices 12 as stored inelectromagnetic profile database 24 to compare with measuredelectromagnetic profiles of suspect electronic devices 12 in order todetermine if the suspect electronic device is authentic or counterfeit.

In operation, authenticity module 10 interfaces with antennae 44, withelectromagnetic profile database 24, and with signal generator 48.Authenticity module 10 communicates an instruction set through a bus 32for execution on electronic device 20, such as the instruction set usedon an authentic electronic device to create electromagnetic profiledatabase 24. Authenticity module 10 commands execution of theinstruction set and commands gathering of electromagnetic profileinformation from antennae 44. Graph 30 depicts an example of frequencyand amplitude information for electromagnetic energy measured for aprocessor 16 and an FPGA 22. Authenticity module 10 compares themeasured electromagnetic profile information with electromagneticprofile information in electromagnetic profile database 24 to determineif electronic device 12 is authentic or counterfeit. The comparison caninclude the frequency of electromagnetic energy, the amplitude ofelectromagnetic energy or other types of relationships. The comparisonmay be automatic based on measured electromagnetic energy values thatfall within a desired range of the electromagnetic energy values of theelectromagnetic profile database 24 values, or may be presented at adisplay for consideration by an end user. Comparisons might also includeelectromagnetic energy differences measured between components of anelectronic device 12 and the differences between the same devices inelectromagnetic profile database 24. As an example, if a counterfeitelectronic device 12 replaced an FPGA 22 with a microcontroller 20 orother type of processor, the processor will run at a higher frequencyand amplitude levels of electromagnetic energy than will the FPGA in theauthentic electromagnetic profile and will also run nearer in frequencyand amplitude to the other processors on electronic device 12.Comparisons might also include a comparison with a known counterfeitdevice electromagnetic profile so that a match with that electromagneticprofile by a device under test establishes the device under test as acounterfeit.

Referring now to FIG. 2, a flow diagram depicts a process foridentifying electronic devices as authentic or counterfeit. The processbegins at step 34 with the development of electromagnetic profiles forauthentic components in an authentic electronic device running underpredetermined conditions. For example, a given instruction set is loopedin execution on the authentic device for set time period with setenvironmental conditions and electromagnetic energy measurements aretaken by antennae 44 and a spectrograph running on authenticity module10. At step 36, an electronic device under test for authenticity isplaced under the predetermined conditions used to generate the authenticelectromagnetic profile, such as by executing the same instruction setat the same environmental conditions for the same time period. At step38, the electromagnetic profile of the electronic device under test ismonitored during the predetermined conditions. At step 40, the authenticelectronic device electromagnetic profile is compared against theelectromagnetic profile measured at the electronic device under test todetermine if the measured electromagnetic profile falls within apredetermined range of the authentic electromagnetic profile. At step42, if the measured electromagnetic profile falls within a predeterminedrange of the authentic electromagnetic profile, the electronic deviceunder test is deemed authentic. If the measured electromagnetic profilefalls outside of the predetermined range of the authenticelectromagnetic profile, the electronic device under test is deemed acounterfeit.

Consequently, the invention is intended to be limited only by the spiritand scope of the appended claims, giving full cognizance to equivalentsin all respects.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for determining whether an electronicdevice is authentic or counterfeit, the method comprising: running theelectronic device under predetermined operating conditions; monitoring athermal profile of the electronic device; comparing the thermal profilewith an expected thermal profile; determining the electronic device asauthentic if the thermal profile has the expected thermal profile; anddetermining the electronic device as counterfeit if the thermal profilelacks the expected thermal profile.
 2. The method of claim 1 furthercomprising: running an authentic electronic device under thepredetermined operating conditions; and monitoring a thermal profile ofthe authentic electronic device to generate the expected thermalprofile.
 3. The method of claim 2 wherein the expected thermal profilecomprises a temperature range associated with the electronic device. 4.The method of claim 2 wherein the predetermined conditions comprise apredetermined set of instructions run for a predetermined time period.5. The method of claim 4 wherein the thermal profile comprises infraredimages taken at predetermined time intervals.
 6. The method of claim 4wherein the thermal profile comprises temperature measurements atpredetermined positions relative to the electronic device over apredetermined time period.
 7. The method of claim 4 wherein the thermalprofile comprises an infrared video taken over a predetermined timeperiod.
 8. The method of claim 1 wherein the electronic device comprisesplural electronic components and wherein comparing further comprisescomparing a thermal profile for each of the plural components with anexpected thermal profile for each of the plural components.
 9. Themethod of claim 8 wherein the electronic device comprises a router andthe plural components comprise one or more field programmable arrays.10. A system for identifying electronic devices as authentic orcounterfeit, the system comprising: a thermal profile database havingexpected thermal profiles for one or more electronic devices under oneor more predetermined operating conditions; a thermal profile detectoroperable to detect a thermal profile of an electronic device under test;and an authenticity module interfaced with the thermal profile databaseand the thermal profile detector, the authenticity module operable tocompare a thermal profile of the electronic device under test with anexpected thermal profile to identify the electronic device as authenticor counterfeit by determining the electronic device as authentic if thethermal profile has the expected thermal profile; and determining theelectronic device as counterfeit if the thermal profile lacks theexpected thermal profile.
 11. The system of claim 10 wherein the thermalprofile detector comprises an infrared camera operable to take staticimages of the electronic device under test at predetermined times. 12.The system of claim 10 wherein the thermal profile detector comprises aninfrared camera operable to take video images of the electronic deviceover a predetermined time period.
 13. The system of claim 10 wherein thethermal profile detector comprises temperature strips placed atpredetermined positions and operable to turn one of plural temperaturesbased on the temperature of the electronic device under test.
 14. Thesystem of claim 10 wherein the thermal profile detector comprisescrystal thermometers placed at predetermined positions and operable tomeasure a temperature of the electronic device.
 15. The system of claim10 wherein the electronic device comprises plural electronic components,the thermal profile database comprises a thermal profile for eachelectronic component under the predetermined operating conditions. 16.The system of claim 15 wherein the thermal profile comprises therelative temperatures of the plural electronic components.
 17. Thesystem of claim 10 wherein the authentic component comprises a fieldprogrammable grid array and the counterfeit component comprises aprocessor.
 18. A method for identifying one or more components of anelectronic device, the method comprising: executing instruction on theelectronic device; measuring a thermal profile for the one or morecomponents; comparing the measured thermal profile for the one or morecomponents with expected thermal profiles; and identifying the one ormore components based upon the comparing; wherein comparing the measuredthermal profile comprises comparing a component thermal profile with anexpected thermal profile of a counterfeit component to identify thecomponent as a counterfeit component.
 19. The method of claim 18 whereinthe expected thermal profile comprises a thermal profile of a fieldprogrammable gate array executing the instructions and the measuredthermal profile comprise a thermal profile of a processor mimicking afield programmable gate array, and wherein identifying the one or morecomponents further comprises identifying the one or more components as acounterfeit.